Binary Instrumentation

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Limitations of NaCl/Wasm Approach

- Need for compiler support
  - Does not work on arbitrary binaries --- binaries should have been compiled using a cooperative compiler
  - Otherwise, the binary will trivially fail the verification step

- Question: Can we instrument arbitrary COTS binaries to insert inline security checks?
Motivation for COTS Binary Instrumentation

- No source code needed
  - Language-neutral (C, C++ or other)
- Can be largely independent of OS
- Ideally, would provide instruction-set independent abstractions
  - This ideal is far from today’s reality

Benefits

- Application extension
  - Functionality
  - Security
  - Monitoring and debugging
Challenges: Disconnect between source and binary code

```c
#include <stdio.h>

void f(int c) {
    printf("%d\n", c);
}

void h(int i) {
    f(i+1);
}

int i(int j) {
    return j+1;
}

int main(int argc, char*argv[]) {
    h(i(argc));
    f(argc+2);
}
```
Compiled Code Example

```c
void f(int c) {
    printf("%d\n", c);
}
```

Function prologue

```
pushl   %ebp
movl    %esp, %ebp
subl    $16, %esp
pushl   8(%ebp)
pushl   $.LC0 ("%d")
call    printf
```

Function epilogue

```
leave
ret
```
Optimized Code Example

```c
void h(int i) {
    f(i+1);
}
```

No push of arguments

No epilogue, not even a call!
main(int argc, char*argv[]) {
    h(i(argc));
    f(argc+2);
}

main:
    pushl   %ebp
    movl    %esp, %ebp
    pushl   %ebx
    subl    $16, %esp
    movl    8(%ebp), %ebx
    pushl   %ebx
    call    i
    movl    %eax, (%esp)
    call    h
    addl    $2, %ebx
    movl    %ebx, 8(%ebp)
    addl    $16, %esp
    movl    %ebx, -4(%ebp), %ebx
    leave
    jmp     f

Return value in eax reg,
No argument push!

No push of arguments to f, tail call
Binary Instrumentation Approaches

- **Static analysis/transformation**
  - Binaries files are analyzed/transformed
  - **Benefits**
    - No runtime performance impact
    - No need for runtime infrastructure
  - **Weakness**
    - Error-prone, problem with signed code (can work around)

- **Dynamic analysis/transformation**
  - Code analyzed/transformed at runtime
  - **Benefit**: more robust/accurate
  - **Weakness**
    - High runtime overhead
    - Runtime complexity (infrastructure)
Phases in Static Analysis of Binaries

- Disassembly
- Instruction decoding/understanding
- Insertion of new code
Disassembly

 Required first step for any binary analysis or instrumentation

 Principal Approaches
   Linear Sweep
   Recursive Traversal
Linear Sweep Algorithm

- Used by GNU *objdump*
- **Problem:**
  - There can be data embedded within code
    - There may also be padding, alignment bytes or junk
  - Linear sweep will incorrectly disassemble such data

```c
Addr = startAddr;
while (Addr < endAddr ) {
    ins=decode(addr);
    addr+=LengthOf(ins);
}
```
Linear Sweep Algorithm

- 804964c: 55 push %ebp
- 804964d: 89 e5 mov %esp,%ebp
- 804964f: 53 push %ebx
- 8049650: 83 ec 04 sub $0x4,%esp
- 8049653: eb 04 jmp 0x8049658
- 8049655: e6 02 04 <junk>
- 8049658: be 05000000 mov $0x5,%esi

Incorrectly disassembles junk (or padding) bytes
Confusion typically cascades past the padding, causing subsequent instructions to be missed or misinterpreted.
Self Repairing Disassembly

- Property of a disassembler where it re-synchronizes with the actual instruction stream
- Makes detecting disassembly errors difficult
  - 216 of 256 opcodes are valid
- Observation: re-synchronization happens quickly, within 2-3 instructions beyond point of error.
Self Repairing Disassembly (example)

Consider the byte stream
55 89 e5 eb 03 90 90 83 0c 03 b8 01 00 00 00 c9

- Linear Sweep output
  100: push ebp
  101: mov ebp, esp
  103: jmp 109
  105: nop
  106: nop
  107: or dword ptr ds:[ebx+eax*1], 0xb8
  111: add dword ptr ds:[eax+eax*1], eax
  113: add byte ptr ds:[eax+eax*1], al
  116: leave

- Correct Output
  100: push ebp
  101: mov ebp, esp
  103: jmp 109
  106: <GAP>
  107: <GAP>
  108: <GAP>
  109: or al, 0x3
  111: mov eax, 0x1
  116: leave
Recursive Traversal

- **Approach:** Takes into account the control flow behavior of the program
- **Weakness:** For indirect jumps, jump target cannot be determined statically, so no recursive traversal of the target can be initiated
- **Some error cases not handled,** e.g., jump to the middle of an instruction

```c
RecursiveTraversal (addr) {
    while (!visited[addr]) {
        visited[addr] = true;
        ins = decode (addr);
        if (isControlTransfer(ins))
            RecursiveTraversal (target(ins))
        if (uncondJumpOrRet(ins))
            return
        else addr+=LengthOf(ins);
    }
}
```
Obfuscation against Static Disassembly

- Conditional jumps where the condition is always true (or false)
  - Use an opaque predicate to hide this
- Instructions that fault
  - Execution continues in exception handler
- Embedding data in the midst of code
  - With indirect jumps that make it impossible to distinguish between code and data
Code Transformation Challenges

- Code transformations change its size
  - Consider, for example, the addition of CFI or SFI checks
- This means code locations are changed
  - Control-flow targets will all be wrong, and need to be “fixed up”
- As usual, direct transfers are easier to handle
  - Their locations can be determined at transformation time
    - It is nontrivial effort in a binary instrumentation tool to fix them up, but doable
Key Problem: Indirect control transfers

- Code pointers look like (integer) data values!
  - For instance, “fptr = &f” will look like “mov eax, 0x080010b8”
- Finding the new location corresponding to 0x080010b8 isn’t hard
  - No different from the handling of direct control transfer targets

But what do we with the constant itself?

- If 0x080010b8 is a reference to code address, then it should be replaced with the new location of the code residing at this address
- If it is data, it should be left alone
- How do we decide?
  - If we make a mistake, the program won’t work correctly!

And what if it is both?

- Used as code address in some contexts, data in other contexts
  - Examples:
    - code that examines itself
    - hash table of code pointers

Note: Some of these code addresses may be stored in read-only data

- const void (*fptr)(int) = &f;
Dynamic Binary Translation
Just-in-time Disassembly

Key question: If disassembly is hard because we don’t know what is code, why not wait until runtime?

Key point: Code knows itself!

- Valid code will only jump to valid locations
- So, delay disassembly of a code snippets until program jumps to them!
  - Code is transformed one basic block at a time
    - Note: It is trivial to reliably disassemble a single basic block, which is straight-line code with no control-transfers in the middle
- Even obfuscated code can be handled
  - No way to “hide” code: it will be found before execution!
Just-in-time Pointer Fixups

♦ Just as we rely on code to reveal itself, can we wait for code pointers to reveal themselves?

♦ Yes!

♦ If a register is used as a jump target, then the content of the register is a code pointer
  • Fixup code pointers just before they are used
  • Called (runtime or dynamic) address translation

♦ Otherwise it is a data pointer or integer
  • Left alone --- this means that we don’t change any of the constants in the original code or data
Dynamic Translation: Can it Work?

- May seem like a road to nowhere
  - Likely to be incredibly slow?

- Not necessarily:
  - Just as SFI can be competitive with hardware memory protection, DynamoRIO showed that runtime disassembly and instrumentation can be practical!
DynamoRIO

All code is discovered at runtime, analyzed at runtime, and then rewritten (“translated”) at runtime.

- Code is transformed one basic block at a time.

- Only the first execution of a basic block requires analysis and rewriting.
  - Subsequent executions can use the same rewritten block.

- Control transfers occur in the last instruction of a basic block.
  - These instructions need to be instrumented:
    * perform address translation
    * if the target code is not already instrumented, disassemble and instrument it

- Non-control-transfer instructions are executed natively.
DynamoRIO Operation

♦ Instrumented programs run in two contexts
  ♦ DynamoRio context (above the redline, representing DynamoRIO runtime). Responsible for detecting the execution of new basic blocks (BBs)
    • These BBs are disassembled, analyzed and then transformed: just-in-time disassembly/rewriting, just before first execution
    • DynamoRIO provides an API for instrumentation: one can use this API to implement custom instrumentation, e.g., count number of BBs executed, number of memory accesses, etc.
  ♦ Application context (below the red line, application code executes natively)
    • Non-control-transfer instructions need no special treatment
    • Control-transfers need to be checked
      ♦ If they are direct transfers, then we check if the target has already been instrumented (and hence is in the code cache). If so, directly jump there. If not, switch into DynamoRIO context to perform instrumentation.
      ♦ Indirect transfers need to go through a translation table
Address Translation

- Implemented using a translation table
  - A hash table jmptab maps the original address of a BB to its new address in the code cache (corresponding to the location of the instrumented version of code)
  - Each time DynamoRIO runtime instruments a BB, it enters the mapping between the original location and the new location in this table.

- At runtime, every indirect CFT to a location \( l \) is translated into \( \text{jmptab}[l] \)
  - Each indirect jump requires a hash table lookup, and has a performance cost
  - Fortunately, common cases (e.g., returns and repeated calls to same target) can be optimized

- If the target is not in \( \text{jmptab} \), then control transferred to DynamoRIO runtime.
DynamoRIO Context Switch

• Preserve the following conditions
  – All GPRs (8 in x86-32)
  – Eflags
  – Some system state. Eg: error code

• DynamoRIO uses one slot in TLS (thread local storage) to store error code (errno) of the application.
  • DynamoRIO will use some library routines that may modify the state as error code, so it is necessary to preserve application’s errno.
DynamoRIO Context Switch

Assumes that the BBs at 0x40106f and the immediately following BBs are not in the code cache. In this case, control has to be transferred to DynamoRIO runtime when execution reaches the end of this BB. Before context switch, all of the application state (in particular, registers) need to be saved.
Transparency & OS Issues

• Transparency: application cannot tell that it is running inside DynamoRIO

• Why does DynamoRIO need transparency?
  – Ensures that application behaves exactly the same way as before: it can’t even tell the difference.
  – So, it can’t evade DynamoRIO, nor can it behave differently.

• Transparency Issues
  – Library transparency
  – Thread transparency
  – Stack transparency
  – Address space transparency
  – Context Translation
  – Performance transparency (not preserved)
Library Transparency

• **Issues** when both DynamoRIO and application enters the same non-re-entrant library routine
  – System state might be broken (errno)
  – Library routine may fail to work (malloc)

• **Solution:**
  – Use *system call* on both windows and Linux
  – Use *stateless library* routines
  – Implement own *memory (de)allocation routines.*
Thread Transparency

• DynamoRIO does not create its own thread
• Why?
  – violate transparency when application that monitors all reads in a process
  – Performance issue when threads double
• What about one DynamoRIO thread?
  – Still violate transparency
  – Performance degrades when multiple threads switch into DynamoRIO mode
• Therefore, use app thread with new context
Stack Transparency

• DynamoRIO does not “touch” application stack.
  – Some applications may access data beyond the top of stack. Eg: Microsoft office
  – Usual stack conventions may not be followed by hand-crafted assembly
    – use of esp as a GPR
  – Ability to read return address off stack and use in computing code location (or modify it)
    – Used in PIC (position-independent code)

• Solution:
  – Use a private stack for each thread in DynamoRIO mode
  – Do not modify content of original stack
Address Space Transparency

• DynamoRIO should not “leak” information about itself.
  – On Windows, intercept
    • NtQueryVirtualMemory() that traverse memory regions
    • GetModuleFileName() (library call) to check if library is present
  – On Linux, intercept
    • mmap(). etc.

• More measures (security)
  – Mark DynamoRIO code as NX, when in code cache
Context Translation

• When exception occurs, the faulting place should be the original code address.
  – Intercept user signal handler
  – Check the address map, find the original address
  – Modify the signal stack and go to user signal handler
Transparency & OS Issues

• Operating System Issues
  – Kernel Mediated Control Flow
  – System Call Handling
  – Thread synchronization
Kernel Mediated Control Flow

- Signal Handling
  - DynamoRIO routine will get control first
  - Signals will be queued and delayed, except urgent signals
    - Eg: SIGSEGV

- When signal arrives, if the thread is at
  - Code cache:
    - Unlink the current basic block, go back to DynamoRIO
    - If bb contains syscall, jump to exit stub before syscall.
      - Why? Bound timing of signal handler, since syscall is expensive.

- DynamoRIO code:
  - Delay signal until reaching a safe place
  - Emulate kernel behavior
System Call handling

- If syscall number is not statically known or on DynamoRIOs list
  - Insert pre-syscall & post-syscall routines around the instruction
- Uninterested syscall: left unchanged. However:
- For signal handling, app must LEAVE code cache QUICKLY (for timing issue)
  - Insert a jump prior to the syscall:
    - Jmp <syscall or bail>
    - Bail: jmp <exit stub>
    - Syscall:
    - <system call instruction>
Program Shepherding: An IRM based on DynamoRIO

◆ Introduces in-line checks to defend against common exploits
  ◇ Buffer overflow attacks
  ◇ Format string attacks
  ◇ Injection of malicious code
  ◇ Re-use of existing code (existing code attacks)

◆ Sandboxing
Program Shepherding
Performance under Linux

Figure 3: Normalized program execution time for our system (the ratio of our execution time to native execution time) on the SPEC2000 benchmarks [25] (excluding all FORTRAN 90 benchmarks) on Linux. They were compiled using gcc -O3. The final set of bars is the harmonic mean. The first bar is for RIO by itself; the middle bar shows the overhead of program shepherding (with the security policy of Table 1); and the final bar shows the overhead of the page protection calls to prevent attacks against the system itself.

- gcc is slow since it consists of many short runs with little code re-use
Windows is much less efficient at changing privileges on memory pages than Linux.
Caveat about performance

- DBT performance measurements usually based very long-running CPU-intensive benchmarks
- These applications represent the “best case scenario” for DBT systems
  - Rewrite once, execute for a long time
- Real-world performance can be bad
  - 10x to 40x slowdown in the worst case
- Example DBT systems
  - DynamoRIO, Pin, Valgrind, ...
- But its exceptional level of compatibility with arbitrary binary code can still be compelling for
  - CPU-intensive applications with tight loops
  - Coarse-granularity instrumentation (i.e., very small fraction of instructions instrumented)
  - Debugging applications
Other Dynamic Transformation Tools

- **Pin**
  - better supported now than DynamoRIO
  - better engineered for Linux

- **Strata**

- **Valgrind**
  - Most popular open-source tool for finding memory errors and many other applications

- **Qemu**
  - Can support whole system emulation
DynamoRIO vs Pin

• Architecture dependency
  – Pin tools: written in c/c++
  – DynamoRIO: written in x86 assembly
  – DynamoRIO’s tools allow users to operate at a lower level
    – Have more control over efficiency, but programming can be hard, and architecture dependent.
BBCount Pin Tool

For more information, including tutorials and examples, see https://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/pin-a-dynamic-binary-instrumentation-tool

```c
static int bbcount;

VOID PIN_FAST_ANALYSIS_CALL docount() { bbcount++; }

VOID Trace(TRACE trace, VOID *v) {
    for (BBL bbl = TRACE_BblHead(trace); BBL_Valid(bbl); bbl = BBL_Next(bbl)) {
        BBL_InsertCall(bbl, IPOINT_ANYWHERE, AFUNPTR(docount),
                       IARG_FAST_ANALYSIS_CALL, IARG_END);
    }
}

int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
    PIN_InitSymbols();
    PIN_Init(argc, argv);
    TRACE_AddInstrumentFunction(Trace, 0);
    PIN_StartProgram();
    return 0;
}
```
BBCount DynamoRIO Tool

static int global_count;

static dr_emit_flags_t event_basic_block(void *drcontext, void *tag, instrlist_t *bb,
    bool for_trace, bool translating) {
  instr_t *instr, *first = instrlist_first(bb);
  uint flags;
  /* Our inc can go anywhere, so find a spot where flags are dead. */
  for (instr = first; instr != NULL; instr = instr_get_next(instr)) {
    flags = instr_get_arith_flags(instr);
    /* OP_inc doesn't write CF but not worth distinguishing */
    if (TESTALL(EFLAGS_WRITE_6, flags) && !TESTANY(EFLAGS_READ_6, flags))
      break;
  }
  if (instr == NULL)
    dr_save_arith_flags(drcontext, bb, first, SPILL_SLOT_1);
  instrlist_meta_preinsert(bb, (instr == NULL) ? first : instr,
    INSTR_CREATE_inc(drcontext, OPND_CREATE_ABSMEM((byte *)&global_count,
      OPSZ_4)));
  if (instr == NULL)
    dr_restore_arith_flags(drcontext, bb, first, SPILL_SLOT_1);
  return DR_EMIT_DEFAULT;
}

DR_EXPORT void dr_init(client_id_t id) {
  dr_register_bb_event(event_basic_block);
}
Applicability of Static Vs Dynamic Techniques

- Some techniques require static instrumentation
  - Any technique that uses static analysis to compute a property and then enforces it at runtime
    - CFI, some aspects of bounds-checking, some types of randomizations, ...

- Others can use dynamic instrumentation
  - Stackguard, SFI (but may be limited if CFI can’t be assured)

- And yet others that cannot use static instrumentation
  - Obfuscated code, mainly malware